1. At 11 a.m. on 28th June 1914, the Austrian Archduke, Francis Ferdinand (Franz Ferdinand), and his wife, were shot dead by an assassin while on a state visit to Sarajevo, capital of what was then the Austrian province of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Francis Ferdinand was the nephew and heir to the Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph (Franz Josef), who reigned 1848-1916. Francis Ferdinand was unpopular at court as he was sullen and suspicious, pressed for reform, and had made a morganatic marriage. However, his death removed a powerful force for peace. For example, in 1913, he had said: "If we do anything against Serbia, Russia will back her, and we shall have war with Russia. Should the Emperor of Austria and the Tsar push each other from the throne, and open the road to revolution?"

It had probably been unwise of the couple to have made the visit when they did, for 28th June was the Serb national day, commemorating the anniversary of the battle of Kossovo of 1389, when the Serbs were decisively defeated by the Turks and Serbia became a Turkish possession.

The six people immediately responsible for the assassination, all but one under 20, were arrested. Only two were old enough for execution, by garrotting. The actual assassin, the 19 year old Serbian student, Gavrilo Princip, died in an Austrian prison in 1918 from tuberculosis, but Cvetko Popovic, who was given four years in gaol for his part, died only in 1981 at the age of 84.

2. The assassins were members of a secret nationalist movement, Young Bosnia, whose goal was the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the adjoining state of Serbia, which had become independent of the Ottoman Empire partly from 1817 and fully from 1878. Young Bosnia was supported (for example with weapons) by the Serbian terrorist organization called "Union or Death" but better known as the Black Hand. This had been set up 1911 with the aim of uniting all Serbs and was headed by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic-Apis, Chief of Intelligence on the Serbian General Staff, although this was common knowledge only after the First World War. Serbian government leaders had been aware of the plot, and the Prime Minister, Nicholas Pasich, had in fact sent the Austrian government a warning, but in vague terms. This vagueness was possibly the result of deliberate bungling by the Serbian minister in Vienna, but the Serb government made no real move to prevent the assassination of the Archduke and his wife. The Russian attach‚ in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, had also been told of the assassination plot, but he too did nothing to prevent it.

3. In prison, Princip told a psychologist that his motive had been to halt the Austrian advance into the Balkans. He also said that he did not believe the assassination caused the war, for which he in no way felt responsible. However, the assassins probably wanted to incite a nationalist outburst, and even, with luck, to force Austria and Russia to go to war against each other, on the assumption that this would bring, as indeed it did, the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia.

4. The assassination did not cause immediate alarm and the French newspaper Le Figaro, reported that there was "Nothing to cause anxiety". After all, anarchist assassinations and attempted assassinations were frequent at the time. For example, in 1900, an anarchist assassinated King Humbert of Italy, and there was an anarchist attempt on the British Prince and Princess of Wales in Brussels; in 1901, President McKinley of the United States was assassinated, followed, in 1903, by King Alexander of Serbia and his Queen; in 1906, a bomb was thrown at King Alfonso XIII of Spain and, in 1913, King George of Greece was killed. Moreover, the Austrian Emperor, Franz Josef, had been especially unlucky. His son Rudolf had apparently committed suicide at Mayerling in 1889, his wife Elizabeth had been stabbed to death with a file by an anarchist lunatic in Geneva in 1898, and his brother Maximilian had been shot by revolutionaries in Mexico in 1867.

5. The Austrian government, led by Carl, Count Stürgkh, the Prime Minister between 1911-16, and, above all, by Leopold, Count Berchtold, the Foreign Minister between 1912 and 1915, insisted that the Serb government had instigated the plot and eventually, on 23rd July 1914, presented a 48 hour ultimatum. The terms were intended to be unacceptable and, if accepted, would have made Serbia virtually part of the Austrian Empire. Before making this impossible ultimatum, Vienna made sure it had the promise of support first from the Hungarian government and then from the German government, all of which took time, so that the ultimatum came almost a month after the actual assassination.

The ultimatum demanded:

- the official condemnation of all anti-Austrian propaganda.

- the establishment of a friendly government.

- the suppression of "unfriendly" publications and organizations.

- the dismissal of a number of officials.

- the arrest of a number of officials.

- the right of the Austrian police and secret police to enter Serbia and collaborate with the Serbian police in their enquiries. (This was not unreasonable as there was Black Hand members in the police and government.)

The Serbs accepted the ultimatum, except for the last two points, which they offered to arbitration.

The Hungarian Prime Minister, Stephen, Count Tisza, between 7th and 14th July, had objected to action against Serbia, but finally agreed in the end only because of the violent and unrepentant tone of the Serbian press, and after the Austrians promised there would be only slight frontier rectifications.

The German Kaiser, William II, who was very upset by the assassination, on 5th July, agreed with his Chancellor, Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg, to support Austria, even to the point of action, but only after diplomacy had been tried first. No military preparations were made (except by the navy), there was no consultation with German industrialists, and on 7th July, the Kaiser started a three week naval cruise. Presumably, the German feeling was that Russia would not interfere against Austria, in view of the nature of the incident, and the strong possibility of Germany supporting Austria. On 27th July, William belatedly made efforts to restrain the Austrian government, but by then it was too late, and his efforts were counter-balanced by Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, who pressed for war.

Matters were not helped by the French President, Raymond Poincaré, who, on a visit to Russia between 20th and 23rd July 1914, supported the French ambassador, Maurice Paleologue, in encouraging the Russians, despite the fact that René Viviani, the French Socialist Prime Minister, was at the same time urging peace and restraint. (See below, II.4.)

6. On 28th July 1914, the Austrian government declared war on Serbia.

30th July 1914, the Russian government ordered mobilization, without consulting her French ally.

1st August 1914, the German government (Chancellor Theodor Bethmann-Hollweg and Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow) declared war on Russia and sent an ultimatum to the French government not to mobilize or intervene. The French gave an evasive response that "we will consult our interests".

3rd August 1914, Berlin declared war on France and issued an ultimatum to the Belgians to permit the transit of troops.

4th August 1914, the British government declared war on Germany, nominally in defence of Belgium, and in accordance with the terms of the 1839 Treaty of London, which guaranteed Belgian integrity and neutrality. The Kaiser became famous for his comment that the treaty was no more than "a scrap of paper", but the British and French, in 1911, had planned to enter Belgium, whether the Germans did or did not!

6th August 1914, the Austrian and Hungarian governments declared war on Russia.

Japan in August 1914, Italy in May 1915, Portugal in March 1916, Romania in August 1916, Greece in November 1916, the United States in April 1917, and China in August 1917 joined Serbia, Russia, France and Britain. In all, the Entente and Associated Powers, as they were called, numbered 27, but the declaration of war by some of these, for example Haiti, brought no actual contribution to the war effort.

In October 1914, the Turkish Ottoman Empire (which had been rebuffed in its offers to Russia in August 1914 of an alliance) and, in October 1915, Bulgaria (to make up for the losses in the Balkan Wars 1912-13) joined the Central Powers, as Germany and Austria-Hungary were called.

1. Austria.

i. The Empire was threatened by nationalism. Out of a total population of 54,000,000 people, a mere 12,000,000, that is, 23%, were German; 10,000,000 or 19% were Magyar (that is, Hungarian); 3,000,000 or 6% were Romanian; and 24,000,000 or 45% were Slav. In 1867, the Magyars had settled for self-government, but the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted independence and union with Serbia, a move, which, if successful, would destroy the Empire as other nationalities would be encouraged to secure independence. Probably the nationalists were a very small but loud minority for many of the non-Germans were aware of the advantages of the Empire, which, above all, promoted trade and prosperity, and gave protection, and was not oppressive in its ways. However, Serbia was viewed as "the Slav Piedmont" and Vienna consequently concluded that the only way out was a "solution by violence" (A.J.P. Taylor), that is, the take over of Serbia, and probably its partition with Albania and Bulgaria. As a result, it was hoped, other nationalities within the Empire would be discouraged from seeking independence.

ii. From 1906, Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Austrian Chief-of-Staff, pressed for a preventive war against Serbia. The Foreign Minister between 1912 and 1915, Count Berchtold, also favoured war and, on 29th June 1914, told the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, that the assassination was an "occasion for a settlement". The Emperor also favoured action against the Serbs, but only if Russia did not intervene. However, Conrad and others thought that war was likely sooner or later against Russia, because of growing Russian power and competition with Russia over domination of the Balkans.

iii. Firm action would also illustrate Austrian vitality, that is, that it was not on the point of collapse, as was widely felt.

iv. There was genuine dislike of the acquisitive, expansionist Serbians.

v. The Austrians had not acted during the Balkan Wars between 1912 and 1913. Count Berchtold had expected a rapid Turkish victory, and William II and the Germans were not willing to help, although William did exert pressure to prevent Serbia gaining a Mediterranean littoral. However, after the assassination in Sarajevo, there was great sympathy for Austria, where it was hoped that the nature of the incident would prevent Russian intervention. In 1914, Hungarian and German support made action possible, and the Austrian ambassador to Serbia, as instructed, broke off relations with Serbia, without bothering to read the Serbian reply to the ultimatum.

2. Germany.

i. "If I had not done it (the assassination), the Germans would have found another excuse" (Princip).

"The Germans were involved in war by Austria, but they went with her willingly" (A.J.P. Taylor). "Both world wars were for and against German supremacy." (A.J.P. Taylor)

The Germans took responsibility for declaring war first, and clearly took the lead throughout on the side of the Central Powers.

ii. German leaders (Chancellors Leo, Graf von Caprivi 1890-94; Chlodwig, Fürst von Hohenlohe 1894-1900; Bernhardt, Fürst von Bülow 1900-1909; and Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg 1909-1916; and Foreign Minister, 1913-1917, Gottlieb von Jagow) after Bismarck's forced resignation in 1890 were not outstanding, and, with William II's support and interference, pursued a "Weltpolitik", a "world policy", also referred to as the "Policy of the Big Stick" and "Full Steam Ahead". This made other European leaders suspicious of the intentions of the German government, which seemed to be showing at every possible chance that it was the dominant power in Europe, and that nothing could be done without its approval. Indeed, the Kaiser in 1896 had said that "nothing must henceforth be settled in the world without the intervention of Germany". The German government also provided inadequate leadership, prompting Berchtold to ask "Who rules in Berlin?"

iii. The crises that resulted from the Weltpolitik were regarded at the time as very important, although now we may regard them as explicable storms in tea-cups.

In 1898, the First German Naval Act (the Tirpitz Act), for a fleet equal in size to the British, challenged the British unnecessarily.

In 1899 and 1900, proposals for a Continental League against Britain over the Boer war alienated the British government and people.

In 1905, in the First Morocco Crisis, the German leaders apparently hoped to break the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 (by showing the French that the British were unreliable) and to gain territory, "a place in the sun". The Kaiser, pushed by Chancellor Bülow, made a speech in Tangier in favour of Moroccan integrity and equal trading opportunities for the countries of Europe. The question was resolved in 1906 by the Algeciras Conference, but Britain and France began military conversations. Bülow's comment that Germany was not to be treated as "a negligible quantity" had not helped matters.

In 1908, the Bosnian or Near Eastern Crisis occurred. Count von Aerenthal (the Austrian Foreign Minister, 1908-12) and Alexander Isvolski (the Russian Foreign Minister, 1906-11), at Buchlau (modern Buchlov in the Czech Republic), agreed that Austria could annex Bosnia-Herzegovina (where Austria since 1878 had the right of occupation) and that the 1841 Straits Rule should be altered to permit Russians warships to pass even if the Ottoman Empire were not at war. However, objections from Britain and elsewhere prevented revision of the Rule (as the Austrians had calculated), whereupon the Russians insisted that the Austrians should rescind their annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. German support for Austria forced the Russians to back down.

1911 saw the Second Moroccan Crisis. When the French occupied Fez to protect Europeans during a revolt against the Sultan, the German government sent the gunboat "Panther" to Agadir to protect the German community, one man having to be brought from Mogador to be protected as there was none in Agadir. War seemed likely, especially after the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, made his speech at the Mansion House in July 1911 warning that Britain was not to be ignored. However, in the end a compromise was arranged, with the Germans recognizing the French control of Morocco, in return for gaining two narrow strips of the French Congo.

Thus, a number of flashpoints occurred in the years before 1914, any of which could easily have led to war, and for which the German leaders were very much responsible.

iv. Otto von Bismarck (the Minister-President, that is, Prime Minister, of Prussia 1862-1871, and then the German Chancellor 1871-1890) had upset the European balance of power by uniting the German states; had prevented the development in Germany of democracy, which might have prevented war 1914, although this is admittedly unlikely, as the socialists in France and Germany generally favoured war in 1914; had accustomed people, especially Germans, to the ideas that wars were legitimate solutions to problems and could be won quickly; had, by reason of his rapid victories over the Danes, Austrians and French, encouraged German feelings of superiority; and, by creating his alliance system after 1871, with the intention of preserving peace and the status quo, had begun the development of rival alliance systems, which contributed eventually to instability in as far as they increased the confidence of the various governments because of support promised by their allies. Thus Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary between 1905 and 1916, commented that "It is the lees left by Bismarck that still foul the cup".

v. Immediately after 1918 (and again to some extent after 1961, when the German historian, Fritz Fischer, published his book entitled "Germany's aims in the First World War"), historians concluded that Germany was bent on war against Russia, as the means to complete and increase its European domination. This had been largely achieved by the defeat of Austria 1866 and France 1870-1871 but Russia, a potential force and rapidly growing in strength, remained as a challenge. In addition, expansion into the Balkans and Russia's western lands (such as the Polish territories, Belorus and the Ukraine) was an old Prussian theme, the old "Drang nach dem Osten" (German for the "pushing towards the east").

German imperialist goals seem proved by:-

Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg's "September 1914 Programme", which included the weakening of France, by, for example, the French ceding colonies, fortresses, mines and a coastal strip, and payment of a war indemnity high enough to prevent war for 15 to 20 years; the annexation of parts of Belgium and all of Luxembourg; the bringing of Holland into a "closer relationship" with Germany; the creation of a Central European Economic Association, which would unite Germany's allies, the defeated, and the Scandinavian countries in a customs union under German leadership; the "thrusting back" of Russia and the end of Russian domination over non-Russians; and acquisition of a large colonial empire in Africa.

the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Brzesc Litowski, then in Poland and now in Belarus), which the Germans imposed on the defeated Russians and which was certainly expansionist. By the treaty, Russia lost about 1/3 its agricultural land and 1/3 its population, 4/5 coal mines, 1/2 its industry, and was pushed back from the Black Sea and virtually from the Baltic. The Treaty of Bucharest imposed on Romania in May 1918 was almost as harsh.

the nature of the German occupation of France between 1914 and 1918 (about 1/10 the country), which gave the impression that the Germans meant to stay.

vi. However, most historians, while accepting that German leaders in 1914 deliberately challenged Russia, have concluded that the German leaders were reluctantly fighting a defensive, preventive war. "The Germans set their war machine in motion because they announced themselves threatened by the military preparations of others they themselves had provoked." (John Keegan, in the Daily Telegraph, 6 November 1998.)

The September Programme, it is argued, was less a cause of war than an attempt to make the most of a war that was being fought for defensive reasons, with the goals of helping to finance the war (once it had been won), to win over imperialists (who undoubtedly existed), and to bring future security be increasing German strength and weakening that of the enemy. Moreover, the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were later and not the work of Bethmann-Hollweg and those who brought about war.

It seemed clear that not only German domination of Europe, but her security, was threatened by the growing power of Russia, compounded by the Franco-Russian alliance arranged in 1893 and 1894, which meant that Germany was encircled by hostile powers. Certain French actions and statements added to German unease. For example, in 1913, the French government increased compulsory military service from two years up to three; French politicians like Poincaré, Delcassé and Millerand were openly hostile to Germany and the French General Joseph Joffre had said: "Give me 700,000 men and I will conquer Europe". Admittedly, such hostility was in large part a response to Germany's Weltpolitik and Bismarck's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 187l.

Neither Bethmann-Hollweg, nor General Helmuth von Moltke, the German Chief of Staff, were war-mongers, but both reached the same conclusion, namely, that war was inevitable and the longer it was delayed, the greater the enemy's advantage. The Kaiser summed up this feeling when he wrote that "I do not entertain the slightest doubt that Russia is systematically preparing war against us" and Moltke considered war was necessary while Germany " could more or less still pass the test". Thus, at the 8th December 1912 "Council of War" (when William discussed the Balkan Wars with his military heads, without the political leaders being present), it was proposed that Austria-Hungary should use the Balkan Wars to start a preventive war against Russia and France, but Admiral Tirpitz had pleaded successfully for a delay, on the grounds that the navy was not ready, especially as the widening of the Kiel Canal was not complete, and, significantly, was completed on 24th June 1914. At the Council, Moltke is recorded as having said: "I hold that war is unavoidable, and the sooner the better".

Why, if they feared encirclement, did German leaders not seek an alternative means to security? The answer is no doubt that they saw no alternative; for example, an alliance with Britain would not have helped much as Britain was a naval not a land power.

The diaries of Bethmann-Hollweg's confidant, Kurt Riezler, say that Bethmann-Hollweg hoped that the Russians would back down, but considered this unlikely. He was also pessimistic about the chances of success, confessing that "the future belongs to Russia, which, growing and growing, is becoming an increasing nightmare to us". Thus war in 1914 was "a desperate sally by men haunted by numerical weakness" (Corelli Barnett) in the face of a rapidly modernizing Russia. This is not to say that some German leaders were not influenced by other factors, such as expansionist dreams in Eastern Europe and feelings of racial superiority, but "the fears of the German leadership concerning the future were almost certainly more important than their ambitions" (Corelli Barnett).

On 29th July 1914, the warnings of the British Foreign Minister, Edward Grey, encouraged Bethmann-Hollweg at the last minute to try to restrain Austria and to arrange negotiations with Russia. However, Moltke pressed for war, and later Basil Liddell Hart commented that "If 3 men can be singled out as the main personal causes of the war, they are Berchtold, Conrad and Moltke". It seemed unavoidable that Britain would join the war, but it was assumed that the war would be over before the British could organize an army, and before their blockade became effective. As a result, no measures were taken to prevent British forces from crossing to the Continent.

vii. To what extent was it "the Kaiser's war", an appellation that is not uncommon? William apparently concluded, as the December 1912 War Council shows, that war against Russia was unavoidable. Yet, on 7th July 1914, he went on his holiday cruise, returning early, on his own initiative on 26th July. Only on 28th July was he told of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum of 23rd July, whereupon he wrote "all reason for war disappears". However, on 27th July, Berlin had been informed that Austria-Hungary would declare war on 28th July but Bethmann-Hollweg seems to have kept William deliberately in the dark, through fear that the Emperor might lose his nerve. Bethmann-Hollweg in fact decided on war without consulting his ministers, even his Foreign Minister, Jagow, who in fact favoured a preventive war in view of the growing Russian strength.

viii. German imperialism. Some Germans desired their "rightful place in the sun", that is, the status symbols of colonies. Serbia was a wedge between the German orbit in Europe, and the Ottoman Empire, where the Germans had growing interests, which were exemplified by the construction of the railway between Berlin and the Iraqi capital, Bagdad. Iraqi oil, especially for the German navy, was an important consideration. Germans, lacking the capital that the French and British had for overseas investment, often saw colonies as an alternative. Colonies would also be useful for the growing German population, which had increased by 43% between 1880 and 1910 to 70,000,000. Gains might also be made in Eastern Europe, for example, in Russian Poland.

ix. German feelings of superiority. In 1900, the Krupp literary prize went to one Schallmayer for his book on the superiority of races. In 1905, the Kaiser, William II expressed his view, which was not that unusual among Germans, that "God has created us to civilise the world". According to the famous Berlin university Professor of History, Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-96), "Europe must be reorganized under the leadership of Germany". The anthropologist, Alfred Woltmann, commented that "All European civilization, even in the Slavonic and Latin countries, has been brought about by the German race".

x. Contrary to myth, Germany was not militarist. In 1914, Germany spent 3.5% GNP on defence, France spent 3.9% and Russia 4.6%. In 1914, the Royal Navy was more than twice the size of the German fleet. German and Austro-Hungarian forces faced forces 2½ times their number. Possibly Germany was the most anti-militarist country as the generally pacifist and internationally-minded Social Democrats were the largest political party.

upper class Germans favoured a preventive war against Russia as a means to unite the country and preserve the outdated social and political structure.

3. Russia.

i. Nominally, the Russians went to war in support of the Serbs because of Pan-Slavism, which saw Russia as the protector of the Slavs. This was clearly for propaganda purposes as Russia in the past had been quite happy to conquer Slav people, especially the Poles, and bring them into the Russian Empire.

ii. However, the Russian leaders (Tsar Nicholas II, 1894-1917: Ivan Goremykin, Prime Minister, January 1914-February 1916: and Serge Sazonov, Foreign Minister, 1910-1916) were influenced more by Germanic advances into the Balkans, and towards the Straits, areas which were of strategic and commercial importance to Russia, and which Russians had long coveted. They also disliked German rivalry for concessions in China. A successful war might even bring possession of the Straits. After all, Russia was traditionally a great imperialist power, so much so that the Norwegian, Fridtjof Nansen, in 1914, estimated that Russia had expanded on average 55 square miles per day for 400 years!

iii. There was great reluctance to accept another national diplomatic humiliation.

In 1878, in the Near Eastern Crisis, when Russia aided Serbia in its war 1876-78 against the Ottoman Empire, and Russian troops reached Constantinople and forced the Turks to agree to the moderate (but favourable to Russia) Treaty of San Stefano. Benjamin Disraeli, the British Prime Minister, had forced the Russians to agree to the less favourable Treaty of Berlin, in which, in particular, there was no "Big Bulgaria" dominated by Russia.

In 1885-8, in the Bulgarian Crisis, Russian efforts to block the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, and the possibility of a Russian occupation of Bulgaria, brought Austrian warnings, which forced the Russians to back down.

1904-1905 had seen the disastrous war against Japan, largely for control of Korea.

In 1908, in the Bosnian or Near Eastern Crisis, the Russians were again defeated when German threats forced them to accept Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to which the Russians had agreed, provided they gained the Straits, which had not materialised.

iv. Russia was clearly unready for war, even though its forces had improved since 1905. The Russian army was twice the size of those of France and Germany and the military budget greater but expenditure per soldier was only 1/2 to 2/3, standards were low and the loyalty of the soldiers was in doubt. General Vladimir Sukhlominov, the Minister of War, and General Janishkevich, the Chief of Staff, were incompetent. Defeat against Japan in 1904-5 had led to revolution and the same was likely to happen in 1914, so that it would have been wiser to have waited to settle accounts until Russian modernization had been completed.

v. However, the Russian government was weak, and decided on war if necessary.

In January 1914, reactionaries persuaded Nicholas II to replace the able Vladimir Kokovtzov (Prime Minister 1911-1914) by Ivan Goremykin, who was amiable, but old and indolent, and whose appointment increased the influence of Sergei Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister 1910-1916. Admittedly, Kokovtzov had left the foreign office largely alone, and Sazonov had agreed to Nicholas Hartwig, Russian ambassador in Serbia, helping organize the Bulgarian-Serbian alliance of 1912, which had encouraged the outbreak of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

Sazonov, who was ignorant about military matters, tried to persuade the Austrians to modify the ultimatum to Serbia, and when this failed, was persuaded by Sukhlominov and the military, who hoped to force the Austrians to back down, to declare an alert, on 26th July, followed on 30th July by mobilization.

Originally, a partial mobilization had been planned but it was found that it was possible only to implement a full mobilization, even though, in those days, mobilization was taken as a virtual declaration of war.

Nicholas II, who had the final say, had reluctantly been persuaded to agree to the mobilization. Perhaps if the holy man, Grigori Rasputin, who was very influential with the Tsar and Tsarina and who considered that war would be disastrous, had not been in hospital recovering from a stab wound, Nicholas might have been persuaded to accept another humiliation, although there is no guarantee that Moltke and Bethmann-Hollweg would have called things off.

vi. Dominic Lieven, in his book Russia and the Origins of the First World War, takes the view that the Tsar and his government were aware that war would not be popular, that rail construction and military preparations would only be ready by 1917-18, that direct Russian interests were not threatened, and that war could not be justified, even if Austria controlled Serbia and Germany the Straits. The Tsar and his government were not stupid but from childhood the Tsar, and to a lesser extent his officials, had had instilled in them a sense of personal and national honour, so that, although they did not want war, the idea of standing by in 1914 was intolerable. There was also the danger that if they did not support Serbia, they would be discredited as a government and this might even provoke revolution.

vii. Thus the Russian government refused to follow the sensible course of backing down and instead steered a collision course, ultimately ordering mobilization, which made war almost certain, just at the time when there was a faint possibility of negotiations. Admittedly, the Germans began to mobilize before news reached them of the Russian mobilization, but this followed the Russian warning on 28th July, which had been intended as a diplomatic move.

4. France, which had been allied to Russia since 1894.

The French leaders (President Raymond Poincaré, Prime Minister René Viviani, and Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé) hoped to avert war, although the War Minister in 1912-1913 and 1914-1915, Etienne Millerand (1859-1943) expressed warlike sentiments. However, they did not try to restrain the Russians because-:

ii. They wanted to avenge the national humiliation of 1870-1871, and perhaps regain Alsace-Lorraine.

iii. Backing Russia was essential if France was to receive help from Russia in time of need. French economic investments in Russia had also to be safeguarded. 80% of Russia's foreign debt was held by Frenchmen, and the Russian debt amounted to 30% French foreign investment.

iv. Victory in the 1911 Morocco Crisis had brought confidence.

v. Like many other people, they seemed to consider war likely sooner or later.

5. Britain.

i. The Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey (supported by the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, 1908-16) worked hard to preserve both peace and the balance of power Possibly he should have made it clearer to the Germans that Britain would become involved if war occurred and not just told the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, that in the event of war, Britain would likely be drawn in. At the same time, public government statements consistently emphasised that ententes were not alliance However, given the British parliamentary system, it would not have been possible for Asquith and Grey to commit the country in advance of the emergency.

ii. Prince Lichnowsky dutifully warned Berlin of probable British involvement but it was unlikely that any British warnings would have deterred Berlin. There, the view was that Britain was a naval power, with a "contemptible little army" (William II), which had not performed too well in the Boer War against the Dutch settlers in South Africa (1899-1902), and it was assumed that the war would be over before Britain organized its blockade (and perhaps an army).

iii. Secret minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence show that Britain considered violating Belgian neutrality if the Germans did not (and later ignored Greek neutrality).

iv. Until 2 August, only Grey and Winston Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) favoured war. Asquith was in two minds, as his letters to his mistress, Venetia Stanley, show. It was feared that Britain would be the next target if the Germans won and the Kaiser was viewed as a new Napoleon, planning – although there was no evidence - to dominate the Continent and attack the British Empire. Possibly the decisive factor was that the Liberal Party leaders feared that they would fall from power if they did not go to wart. For, if Grey and Churchill had not won on 2 August, they would have resigned and the government would have fallen, with the Tories, it was assumed, taking over and going to war.

6. Serbia.

i. That the Serb leaders (King Peter Karageorgevich, 1903-21, whose ill health brought the regency from July 1914 of Prince Alexander, King 1921-34; and Nicholas Pasich (or Pasic), Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 1912-19) were ambitious and expansionist is clearly shown by the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, and by the establishment of Yugoslavia, which was the new name, in October 1929, for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which had been created in December 1918. They also resented their failure in the Balkan Wars to gain all Macedonia and, more important, Albania, which would have given them the longed-for coast. Moreover, like Serbs generally, they had memories of the great l4th century Serb Empire, especially under Stephen Dushan 1331-1355, emperor of the Serbs, Albanians, Bulgars and Greeks. Pasich, after the Balkan Wars, had said "the first round is won. Now we must prepare for the second, against Austria" although that did not necessarily mean war.

ii. Serb relations with Austria were poor, largely because of Austrian interests in the Balkans, where the Serbs wanted to dominate. The years 1905 to 1907 witnessed the "Pig War", a tariff conflict between Austria and Serbia and so named because pigs were one of Serbia's main exports. This was won by the Serbs, who had found alternative markets. Then, in 1908 came the Bosnian or Near Eastern Crisis, when Baron Alois von Aehrenthal, the forceful Austrian Foreign Minister between 1906 and 1912, annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina to put in their place Serb nationalists inside and outside the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary.

iii. The assassination in 1914 was apparently organized by Colonel Dimitrievich, Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Serbian General Staff, although his exact motives are unclear. 28th June was the Serb national day and it may just have been a "protest" at the Austrian insult of an Austrian official visit to Sarajevo that day. Pasich apparently knew about the plot but did little or nothing to stop it. The Serbs presumably did not expect war, as they were unready for it so soon after the Balkan Wars. Furthermore, it is very debatable whether the assassination had much to do with the outbreak of war.

iv. Serbia's main "contribution" to war in 1914 was the way it encouraged Slav nationalism within Austria, by its policies and its very existence, and so threatened Austria-Hungary with dismemberment. There was also the effect of the Serbian press on the Hungarian premier, Stephen Tisza.

7. The Ottoman Empire.

The decline of the Ottoman Empire produced a power vacuum, and competition and conflict over the spoils, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Straits.

8. Japan.

The Japanese victory over Russia in the war of 1904 to 1905 prompted the Russians to turn to the Balkans and to be less willing to accept another national humiliation.

9. Nationalism.

Serbian, Russian, and French national feelings contributed to the outbreak of war in 1914. German nationalism was one reason for German expansionist (imperialist) policies. Serb nationalism also made Serbia imperialist.

10. Expansionism/ Imperialism.

Germany and Russia (and possibly Austria) were imperialist powers anxious to expand. Serbia too was expansionist.

11. Alliances.

i. The First Three Emperors' League, which had been arranged 1872-1873 by the Emperors of Austria, Germany and Russia, promised consultation and military assistance if any of the three countries was attacked. Bismarck refused to endorse this.

ii. The Dual Alliance of Austria and Germany had been arranged by Bismarck in 1879 and was still operative in 1914. Possibly one of Bismarck's reasons for the alliance was to influence Austrian policy in order to prevent a clash with Russia over the Balkans, which seemed very likely in view of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The alliance promised military assistance it either were attacked by Russia and benevolent neutrality if attacked by another country.

iii. In l88l. Bismarck arranged the Second Three Emperor's League, in which the Austrian, German and Russian governments promised benevolent neutrality if any of the three went to war against a fourth country, except for the Ottoman Empire. The treaty was renewed in 1884 but was allowed to lapse in 1887.

iv. The Triple Alliance of Austria, Germany, and Italy was arranged by Bismarck in 1882 and was renewed until 1915. Its terms stipulated that Austria and Germany were to help Italy if Italy were attacked by France; and Italy was to help Germany if Germany were attacked by France. If attacked by a country other than France, there was to be benevolent neutrality at least. If attacked by two other countries, all were to join in. On Italian insistence, the alliance was not to be operative against Britain.

v. In 1887, Bismarck arranged the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, in place of the Three Emperor's League, which had been allowed to lapse. The new treaty established that Germany would be neutral if Russia went to war, except if Russia attacked Austria; Russia would be neutral if Germany went to war, except if Germany attacked France; and Germany would support Russia diplomatically over Bulgaria and the Straits. (Bismarck was aware that Austrian and British opposition to Russian designs in these areas would prevent any Russian gains!) The Treaty lasted only until 1890, when Bismarck resigned and his heirs allowed the arrangement to lapse.

vi. By the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance, arranged in 1893 and 1894, the French agreed to help the Russians if Russia were attacked by Germany, or Austria aided by the Germans. For their part, the Russians agreed to help the French if France were attacked by Germany or Italy aided by Germany.

vii. Britain in 1902 signed an alliance with Japan, in which both signatories promised neutrality if the other went to war against one power and armed help against more than one power. This was the first alliance made by the British but it did not really mean the end of British isolation as there was still no alliance within Europe.

viii. In 1904, Britain and France made the Entente Cordiale. This was not an alliance but, as the name indicates, an "understanding" that merely settled colonial disputes, for example over Egypt and the Sudan, over which, following the incident at Fashoda in 1898, Britain and France had nearly gone to war; over Siam; over West African colonies; and over the New Hebrides in the Pacific. However, the Second Morocco Crisis against Germany in 1911 caused the British government to agree to send a force to support French forces if it came to war and, further, in 1912, to make a secret naval agreement with the French for British naval support for France in the Channel in the event of war against Germany, in exchange for French naval support in the Mediterranean. Consequently, although there was no formal alliance, Britain was committed in 1914 to assist France.

ix. In 1907, the Anglo-Russian Entente was made, establishing the Triple Entente. Like the Anglo-French entente, it was not an alliance but merely the settling, more or less, of disagreements, which for the most part were over colonies, and notably over Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet. However, the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, in the spring of 1914, rejected proposals that the Entente should become an alliance and only agreed to Anglo-Russian naval conversations.

x. Although alliances perhaps gave added confidence to countries involved in disputes, they were not really a cause of war since in the run-up to war in 1914, governments did not act in strict accordance with treaties but acted in line with their interests. For example, in 1904, the French had not been very supportive of the Russians in their war against Japan, while the Russians were not too responsive in the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911. In 1914, had they wanted, the French could have remained neutral, despite the Dual Alliance, as they had not been consulted before Russia mobilized. As for the Italians, in 1914 they did not join their allies of the Triple Alliance and eventually in 1915 joined the opposing Entente side.

12. Militarism and the arms race.

i. Before the fighting began, Colonel Edward House, the special envoy of the US President, Woodrow Wilson, expressed the opinion that "the situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run mad. Unless someone acting for you can bring about a different understanding, there is some day to be an awful cataclysm. No one in Europe can do it. There is too much hatred, too many jealousies". And once fighting began, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, commented that "the enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by these... made war inevitable".

ii. However, it was not so much the arms race as the undue influence of the military leaders, and military planning. For example, the Kaiser had hoped to limit war to Russia but was told that the Schlieffen Plan of attack necessitated war against France too.

iii. Despite conventional wisdom, Germany was not militaristic. German conscription was limited and there was a peace time army of only 624,000, which was increased in 1913 to 800,000. The Germans supported by 425,000 Austro-Hungarians were clearly outnumbered by 790,000 French and 1,300,0000 Russians. The Germans, with a population of 68,000,000, considered that their armed forces should be larger than those of the French, who numbered only 40,000,000.

The Germans were very alarmed by the French law of 1913 for a three year conscription, in place of two years, since this, it was assumed, would mean an intolerable economic burden for the French unless they were getting ready for war. Admittedly, German leaders believed in technical and training superiority, rather than numbers, knowing they would always be outnumbered by the Russians.

German governments were of course responsible for the naval arms race against Britain, which soured Anglo-Germans relations unnecessarily. However, it was the strength of the German armies, not their navy, that caused alarm to the Russians and French and it seems that, by 1914, Britain had found that she could outbuild Germany navally.

13. Trading competition and economic causes.

i. According to some, especially the Marxists, the war was the result of economic competition between the capitalist powers. Somewhat confusingly, Marxists tend to refer to this economic competition as imperialism. However, Britain and Germany, the main economic powers, were good trading partners, whose products tended to complement each other. Bethmann-Hollweg believed in 1914 that the British Empire was founded on making money and would be against war. For their part, German industrialists were generally against war and were making good progress in French and Russian markets. For example, in 1913, the Ruhr industrialist, Hugo Stinnes, said that 3 to 4 years of peace would bring Germany unchallenged economic mastery of Europe. It would seem that German economic interests in South East Europe and the Ottoman Empire were of minor importance.

ii. In addition, rapid industrial development in Germany had brought considerable economic and political strains, so that, it is alleged, some German bourgeois saw a successful war as the means to destroy opposition, especially that of the socialists, and to preserve the existing social order. While there is probably some truth in this, there was also widespread concern in 1914 in German government circles that war might lead to revolution.

14. The absence of international machinery.

The 26-nation Hague Disarmament Conference of 1898 had failed to bring disarmament but had set up the International Court in the Hague to which governments could appeal when in dispute. While this was not as comprehensive as the machinery provided by the League of Nations after 1919 or by the United Nations after 1945, it could have been used. Moreover, countries in dispute since 1919 have not been noticeably ready to use the League or United Nations to settle disputes.

15. The mood of the times.

i. There was general acceptance of the ideas of Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), the Director of the Berlin Military Academy, whose book, On War, published in 1832, took the view that war was perfectly normal and "the continuance of politics by other means".

ii. Bismarck's wars between 1864 and 1871 had accustomed people to the idea that war would be short and not particularly destructive, the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, for example, that revolution might result, generally being ignored. It was also believed that "civilized Europe" would not fight a war anything like the brutal US Civil War of 1861-65. It was also thought that it would be impossible economically to sustain a long modern war for more than a few months. The Hungarian Finance Minister thought that three weeks of fighting would be the maximum.

iii. Admittedly, some people took the view that, although war would mean some suffering, it would also mean progress, and would take a nation to the highest pitch of efficiency. This view was expressed, for example, in l896 by one Benjamin Kidd in his book, Social Evolution.

16. Personalities.

Above all, there was the absence of outstanding ones like Bismarck. Instead, there were leaders like Berchtold, Conrad von Hötzendorf, Moltke, William II, and Nicholas II.

17. Miscalculations.

War would be short and not particularly destructive.

Russia would probably back down, although German leaders do seem to have been ready for war even if the Russians did not back down.

18. Circumstances.

The decline of the Ottoman Empire was the main long term cause for the war.

The alliance "system" initiated by Bismarck perhaps contributed to the outbreak of war.